Toward the Baltic Sea Socioeconomic Action Plan by Ollikainen, Markku et al.
ECOSYSTEM GOVERNANCE IN THE BALTIC SEA
Toward the Baltic Sea Socioeconomic Action Plan
Markku Ollikainen , Berit Hasler, Katarina Elofsson, Antti Iho,
Hans E. Andersen, Mikołaj Czajkowski, Kaja Peterson
Received: 14 June 2018 / Revised: 30 August 2019 / Accepted: 14 September 2019 / Published online: 11 October 2019
Abstract This paper analyzes the main weaknesses and
key avenues for improvement of nutrient policies in the
Baltic Sea region. HELCOM’s Baltic Sea Action Plan
(BSAP), accepted by the Baltic Sea countries in 2007, was
based on an innovative ecological modeling of the Baltic
Sea environment and addressed the impact of the
combination of riverine loading and transfer of nutrients
on the ecological status of the sea and its sub-basins. We
argue, however, that the assigned country-specific targets
of nutrient loading do not reach the same level of
sophistication, because they are not based on careful
economic and policy analysis. We show an increasing gap
between the state-of-the-art policy alternatives and the
existing command-and-control-based approaches to the
protection of the Baltic Sea environment and outline the
most important steps for a Baltic Sea Socioeconomic
Action Plan. It is time to raise the socioeconomic design of
nutrient policies to the same level of sophistication as the
ecological foundations of the BSAP.
Keywords Cost-effectiveness  Incentives  Innovation 
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INTRODUCTION
The greatest environmental challenge in the Baltic Sea is
eutrophication and the ecological risks it causes (Reusch
et al. 2018). The Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), accepted
by HELCOM member countries in 2007 and revised in
2013, aims to achieve a good ecological status of the sea. It
defines overall reduction targets of nutrients (15 200 t P
and 118 000 t N) as well as specific targets for all sub-
basins of the sea to be achieved by 2021 (HELCOM 2013).
BSAP is based on innovative ecological modeling of the
Baltic Sea, combining riverine loading and transfer of
nutrients within the sea with eutrophication in the sea and
its sub-basins (Backer and Leppa¨nen 2008). Thus, the
BSAP has a firm rooting in the knowledge of the dynamics
of eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. However, the ecologi-
cal goals of the BSAP are mechanically translated to
nationally assigned reduction targets, without consideration
of whether such an allocation is cost-effective or follows
equity of cost-burden sharing.
Since the acceptance of the BSAP, overall nutrient
loading to the Baltic Sea has slowly decreased—by
approximately 19% for P and 24% for N—between the
reference period of 1997–2003 and 2012–2014 (HELCOM
2017). The reduction targets of the BSAP are 11% for N
and 43% for P for the riverine loads, so the distance to the
goal is still considerable. The area of anoxic bottoms has
been increasing, however (Carstensen et al. 2014). The
slow progress in the implementation of the BSAP has some
obvious reasons. In contrast to the science-based ecological
modeling, the assigned country-specific reductions of
nutrient loading have not reached the same level of
sophistication. They have not been founded on economic
and policy analysis. Instead of being cost-efficient, they are
unnecessarily expensive and considered unfair, especially
in regard to the country-specific allocation of cost-burden
(Ollikainen and Honkatukia 2001; Gren 2008; Elofsson
2010; Hasler et al. 2014; Nainggolan et al. 2018; Reusch
et al. 2018). The results of these studies suggest that there
would be considerable cost savings if more of the nutrient
emission reductions occurred in Poland and Russia. How-
ever, Finland and Sweden would receive most of the ben-
efits from improved water quality (Ahtiainen et al. 2014).
As a result, achieving a cost-effective solution requires
multi-national thinking and hence faces various policy
challenges.
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Perhaps the largest hindrance in designing efficient
paths for achieving the abatement targets at the time when
BSAP was signed is the vague understanding of polluters’
incentives and difficulties in designing a policy that would
take polluter heterogeneity into account. Since then, there
has been considerable progress in research on policy
instruments, incentives, and mechanisms, particularly in
the context of water quality management (see Winsten and
Hunter 2011; Xepapadeas 2011; Shortle 2017; Shortle and
Horan 2017 for surveys). Despite this progress in knowl-
edge, countries have rarely adopted innovative policies,
such as using environmental benefit indexes, tendering
systems or trading and compensation mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, means to promote citizens’ engagement and
awareness are lacking. Today, an increasing gap exists
between the new policy possibilities and the existing policy
structure in the protection of the Baltic Sea. The current
policy is characterized by command-and-control-based
approaches to point sources and technology-specific poli-
cies (command-and-control as well as agri-environmental
support) toward nonpoint sources. It is time to raise the
socioeconomic design of nutrient policies to the same level
of scientific excellence as the natural science underpin-
nings of the BSAP.
The objective of this paper is to outline, at a strategic
level, the most important steps to improve nutrient policies
in the Baltic Sea region. We identify the largest weak-
nesses of current policies and suggest economic instru-
ments that are better suited for regulating point and
nonpoint sources of nutrient loadings. We emphasize the
need for technological developments in nonpoint sources to
reduce loading and analyze key factors needed to promote
it. We demonstrate the need for coherence between water
and emerging climate policies, especially in the case of
agriculture. We point out the main obstacles to improving
policies. We outline basic ingredients for an effective
Baltic Sea Socioeconomic Action Plan. Such a plan is
needed not only for national policymakers but also for the
European Union’s policies relevant to combating eutroph-
ication, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
environmental directives, and the Baltic Sea Region
Strategy.
REDUCTION POTENTIAL VERSUS ABATEMENT
COSTS—POINT AND NONPOINT SOURCES
There is a fundamental difference between nutrient load
policies aimed at point sources, such as waste water
treatment plants (WWTPs) and industry, and those target-
ing nonpoint sources, such as agriculture and forestry.
Point sources release nutrient loads via definite points,
pipes, so their loads can be easily measured and directly
subjected to regulation. Nonpoint loads, in contrast, are
diffuse, coming from surface and drainage; they are
stochastic due to varying weather and often associated with
a delay between action and releasing loadings. Therefore, it
is not possible to register the exact amounts of nutrients
that are released from a given field parcel or forest plot,
making it impossible to levy policy instruments directly on
loads (Shortle and Dunn 1986). The only possibility is to
target instruments on inputs and management practices that
indirectly determine nutrient loads. Thus, for nonpoint
sources, only a second-best policy is an option. Further-
more, while effective technologies can be employed to
reduce loads from point sources, often at low costs, mea-
sures for agricultural nonpoint are less effective and
sometimes more expensive and uncertain due to stochas-
ticity and spatial heterogeneity in biogeochemical pro-
cesses (Elofsson 2010; Hyytia¨inen and Ollikainen 2012;
Hasler et al. 2018). Therefore, cost-effectiveness analyses
give much higher abatement rates for point sources than
nonpoint sources. This feature is sometimes understood
poorly; for instance, BSAP gives little attention to the
possibilities and need of reducing nitrogen in WWTPs
cost-effectively.
Table 1 provides information on nutrient inputs to the
Baltic Sea apportioned to sources including natural back-
ground and atmospheric deposition on the sea. The table is
based on annual reporting by the contracting parties to
HELCOM (Personal communication Lars Svendsen, DCE,
Aarhus University). Diffuse sources, mostly agricultural,
are responsible for 39% of nitrogen and 49% of phosphorus
loads, while the respective shares of point sources are 8%
(N) and 16% (P).
To illustrate the importance of the effectiveness of
measures and their costs, consider cost estimates for
nutrient reduction in Finnish agriculture: reducing both
nitrogen and phosphorus loads by 20% entails marginal
costs € 9,4 (kg N)-1 and € 223 (kg P)-1 (Hyytia¨inen and
Ollikainen 2012). Compare these estimates to marginal
abatement costs in waste water treatment plants (WWTPs)
for the Baltic Sea: a 90% reduction in nitrogen costs
approximately € 11 (kg N)-1 and a 95% reduction in
phosphorus costs € 17 (kg P)-1 (Hautakangas et al. 2014).
The difference in marginal costs between the two sectors is
large, especially in regard to the cost of phosphorus
reduction. Adapting from Hautakangas et al. (2014), if
WWTPs abate according to the Urban Waster Water
Directive (UWWTPD), their annual abatement costs are
less than 500 M €. Increasing the abatement rate up to 95%
P and 90% N would increase their costs to approximately 1
100 M€ and produce a reduction of 85 000 t N and 9 600 t
P (Hautakangas and Ollikainen 2018). Thus, requiring a
high abatement rate in WWTPs and allocating the
remaining part of the reduction target to agriculture would
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keep the total costs low. Following this approach, Ahlvik
et al. (2014) cover both WWTPs and agriculture and sug-
gest that in the cost-effective solution, the total cost of
achieving the BSAP targets would in this case be approx-
imately 2 000 M€. Hasler et al. (2014) estimate a total cost
of 4 100 M€ for a similar solution. This range reveals some
uncertainty on the costs and data. Nevertheless, following
cost-effectiveness could lead to significant savings, relative
to arbitrarily selecting targets for different measures.
This discussion provides a lesson: cost-effective abate-
ment with equalization of the marginal abatement cost
should be the guiding principle of nutrient policies toward
point and nonpoint sources, because this principle reflects
best the technological and economic possibilities to reduce
loads the most.
Policies for point sources
Abatement of nutrients in WWTPs and industrial point
sources provides the backbone of any well-designed policy
for the Baltic Sea protection. Abating both nutrients in the
WWTPs is certain and less costly relative to other sectors,
albeit reducing nitrogen requires a high initial but a long-
lasting investment. The best available technique facilitates
higher emissions reductions than the abatement rates in the
above example, as experience in many countries has
demonstrated. Hautakangas and Ollikainen (2019) provide
examples of abatement rates in various plants. They sug-
gest that it would be justified to require WWTPs to abate at
least 95% of phosphorus and close to 90% of nitrogen.
The main weakness of nutrient policies toward point
sources is that both the EU’s Urban Waste Water Directive
and HELCOM recommendations are inattentive relative to
current abatement possibilities and abatement costs, and we
propose that they should be scaled up accordingly.
Another weakness of policies toward point sources is
their reliance on command-and-control instruments only.
Countries should make further efforts by financing research
and providing result-based schemes, to create better
incentives to extend abatement beyond conventionally
known abatement technologies. These efforts include
economic incentives not only to increase abatement but
also to find new and innovative ways to treat wastewater,
such as extracting phosphorus from sewage water for new
products and using the abatement process and sludge to
produce energy in the spirit of the EU’s circular economy
initiative.
A topic not so often discussed in the literature is
abatement in industrial point sources. It is a drawback that
HELCOM does not report separate data on industrial point
sources’ contributions to nitrogen and phosphorus loads at
the Baltic Sea level but provides only an aggregate number
for all point sources. Databases for improving water poli-
cies toward industrial point sources should be developed.
Policies for agricultural nonpoint sources
As the setting of optimal taxes or quantitative limits on
runoff from fields is infeasible, many countries have agri-
environmental schemes that rely on farmers’ voluntary
participation and pay for taking conservation measures
among the given a set of measures targeting nutrient loads.
Designing an effective voluntary agri-environmental pro-
gram faces three basic challenges: (i) how to make it
effective for water protection, (ii) how to invite the farmers
that could contribute the most to the goals of the program
(Schroeder et al. 2015), and (iii) how to ensure that farmers
comply with the requirements (Winter and May 2001).
Participation rates in programs depend on farmers’ atti-
tudes toward a cleaner environment and the amount of the
compensation relative to the costs and trouble of applying
the measures (e.g., Pannell et al. 2006). Higher compen-
sation increases participation, and more demanding and
costly measures reduce it.
Voluntary agri-environmental programs
All member states in the EU have a voluntary agri-envi-
ronmental program that compensates for the average costs
of implementing the measures using area-based payments.
Table 1 Nutrient loads (tons) to the Baltic Sea in 2000 and 2014 (Personal communication Lars Svendsen, DCE, Aarhus University). Figures are
actual, nonclimate normalized loads. Point sources include point sources directly to the sea and point sources to inland surface waters (see also
http://www.helcom.fi/baltic-sea-action-plan/nutrient-reduction-scheme/progress-towards-maximum-allowable-inputs)
Source/year N N P P Reduction by 2014
2000 2014 2000 2014 N P
Natural background 188 000 165 000 9 200 8 000 23 000 1 200
Point sources 72 000 58 000 8 400 4 400 14 000 4 000
Diffuse sources 434 000 293 000 20 300 13 800 141 000 6 500
Atmospheric deposition on BAS 310 000 240 000 2 100 2 100 70 000 0
Total 1004 000 756 000 40000 28 300 248 000 11 700
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Furthermore, the Basic Payment Scheme (CAP Pillar I
income support) contains cross-compliance conditions,
which require farmers to undertake environmental mea-
sures to be eligible for the single farm payment. Figure 1
summarizes the participation of farmers in the agro-envi-
ronmental schemes in 2013 (Source: Eurostat).
Participation rates in voluntary agri-environmental pro-
grams vary enormously, with Denmark, Poland, Latvia,
and Lithuania having low participation rates. Caution
should, however, be used when assessing the role of high
participation rates in producing water quality improvement.
There is a trade-off between participation and ambition.
For instance, Lankoski and Ollikainen (2013) demonstrate
that the Finnish agri-environmental program has been very
generous, providing large overcompensation, keeping low
profit farms and marginal lands in production, and actually
increasing nutrient loading. Hasler et al. (in the present
volume) find large heterogeneity among farm types in
farmers’ reservation prices to enter into voluntary agro-
environmental schemes.
The impact of the measures included in agri-environ-
mental schemes on nutrient loads depends on their envi-
ronmental effectiveness and local conditions. Most
programs offer a set of measures for farmers to choose
from, such as buffer strips and buffer zones, reduced fer-
tilization, catch crops, conservation or restoration of wet-
lands, grassland management, set-aside and cover crops
(Zimmerman and Britz 2016). Unfortunately, some abate-
ment or conservation practices may have adverse effects on
other environmental targets. For instance, a measure
effective in reducing particulate phosphorus tends to
increase the loading of dissolved phosphorus (Dodd and
Sharpley 2016), or management designed for water quality
may increase air emissions (Aillery et al. 2005; Smith et al.
2017).
We conclude that the major reason for the slow progress
of nutrient abatement in agriculture is that current policy
instruments are not cost-effective and are sometimes
insensitive to trade-offs between environmental targets.
Incentives and targeting
The slow progress in reducing nutrient loading is related to
the way the programs are tailored. The AES programs
compensate farmers for taking the requested measures
irrespective of their impacts on nutrient loads or other
environmental effects. As a result, a farmer adopting a
measure that leads to little improvement in water quality
receives the same compensation as a farmer who can
efficiently reduce nutrient loads. This is a clear waste of
resources: both public funds and farmers’ efforts. A shift to
performance-based schemes, drawing on the expected
impacts of input choices on loads, would lead to environ-
mental effectiveness, promote the best measures in each
location and provide a higher return to public funds. There
are two promising avenues to improve performance of
policies: a shift from flat rate (cost-based) subsidies to
incentive-based instruments, and increasing environmental
targeting (result-based measures) by introducing environ-
mental benefit indexes to both flat rate policies and
incentive-based schemes. Both avenues facilitate improved
environmental targeting, and the incentive-based instru-
ment helps by using government budget money more
efficiently.
Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1997)
demonstrate the usefulness of tendering over flat rate pol-
icy. Figure 2a, b uses tendering to establish our argument in
favor of performance-based instruments in an intuitive
way. Consider an area-based support payment for partici-
pation in the national agri-environmental scheme. The
payment compensates for the costs of taking measures to
reduce runoff (such as buffer strips, gypsum, catch crops,
or structural liming). Let the annual government budget be
G and the area payment be s per ha. Suppose for simplicity
that each farmer supplies a field parcel of size one hectare
(denoted by i) to the program and implements some of the
listed water quality measures on this parcel. The costs of
these measures, ci, differ between farms. Figure 2a orders
the submitted parcels from the least expensive to the most
expensive. The horizontal axis measures the number of
parcels, and the vertical axis measures the costs and the
subsidy.
In Fig. 2a, parcel 5 is the last enrolled in the program,
and s*5 = G (the budget is exhausted). The last parcel (5)
receives a compensation that exactly matches its farmer’s
opportunity costs but the others receive ‘‘overcompensa-
tion’’ (area between the pillars and the horizontal flat rate
s), because their costs are lower than the payment. This
overcompensation is information rent, as it results from the
authorities’ incomplete information on farmers’ costs.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Denmark
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Germany
Estonia
Sweden
Finland
Ulised Agricultural Area under Agro -
Environmental Programs, % 2013
Fig. 1 Participation rates in voluntary agro-environmental programs
in percent of utilized agricultural area Source: Eurostat
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Because of overcompensation, only 5 parcels are enrolled
in this example, and parcels 6 and 7 remain out of the
program.
In environmental tendering, the authorities announce the
environmental goals (a reduction nutrient runoff) and invite
farmers to offer their fields with assigned water protection
measures to the program. While under a discriminatory
tendering, each enrolled field parcel receives exactly its
bid; under a uniform tendering, a uniform compensation is
paid for all winning parcels (Romstad et al. 2012). Under
tendering, the challenge of asymmetric information
regarding the effects of implementing particular measures
at different fields remains, but for cases with similar
effectiveness of measures, this leads to selecting the lowest
cost options.
Figure 2b illustrates an outcome of a discriminatory
tendering system under the farmers’ original opportunity
costs and the original conservation budget. The sum of the
cost pillar and new light red pillar indicates the size of the
bid in each parcel. This sum indicates the bid curve asso-
ciated with supplied parcels. Thanks to the light red pillars,
it is located above the true cost curve but starts well below
the flat rate s and surpasses it at some point. As farmers are
paid according to their bids, the tendering system reduces
information rents to farmers much below that of the flat
rate subsidy (the reduction of information rent is the white
area above the bids and below s). As the government saves
money, more fields can be allocated in the program. In
Fig. 2b, additional parcels 6 and 7 are enrolled, indicating
that water protection effort increases due to more efficient
use of the original government budget money.
Both tendering and flat rate policies can be improved by
using a performance-based approach, such as environ-
mental benefit indexes (EBIs), which assess the environ-
mental performance of the chosen measures. An EBI is
simply a number, scaled, for instance, between 0 and 1 or 0
and 100. An EBI is a product of chosen features drawing on
their modeled impacts on water quality and weighted by
their relative contribution to it. For instance, such features
include slopes of fields, sizes of the buffer strips, or soil
phosphorus reserves. How well the constructed EBI
describes factors determining nutrient runoff depends
directly on the state of scientific knowledge. EBIs also help
to differentiate fixed payment rates and target more effi-
ciently environmental outcomes, as is done in the Con-
servation Reserve Program (CRP) (Hellerstein 2017).
In the Baltic Sea region, Finland arranged a tendering
pilot with an EBI focusing on a reduction of phosphorus
loads. The EBI was constructed using three features: soil
phosphorus contents, slopes of fields, and distances to
water ways. Field parcels were enrolled in the program
according to the ratio of an EBI to bid. Information rents
turned out to be very low, approximately 5–10% of the
payments (see Iho et al. 2014). Despite a good experience,
Finland has not adopted such a tendering system. One
obstacle for introducing these performance-based incen-
tives is that payments for the amount of reduced loads are
not feasible under the present EU regulation, which allows
only compensation for the cost. This refusal to accept
incentives, which are important for the performance-based
instruments, is artificial and mistaken: as Fig. 2a shows, the
area payment equals the conservation costs of only the last
parcel, and other parcels receive information rent. This
rigid and unfounded regulation has prevented the intro-
duction of modern instruments, such as tendering systems,
to promote efficiency and the targeting of environmental
protection efforts.
Interestingly, there is an ongoing reform to change the
CAP payment system to better facilitate country-specific
schemes (European Commission 2019) and offer grants as
1        2        3          4         5          6       7
c5
c4
c3
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s
Land parcels
costs,
subsidy
c7
c6
1        2        3          4         5          6       7
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c4
c3
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s
Land parcels
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informaon rentsc7
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b
a
Fig. 2 a Flat rate payment and participation. b Tendering system and
participation
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incentives to farmers to adopt environmental and climate
friendly practices, going beyond the costs incurred or the
income foregone, but still conforming to least-trade-dis-
torting rules (green box) set by the WTO.
We emphasize the need to change the present rigid EU
regulation to facilitate modern, incentive-based, and per-
formance-oriented agri-environmental policy instruments
in the process toward the post-2020 CAP.
Livestock production and manure: Policies for semi-
nonpoint polluters
Livestock production provides a challenge of its own. The
increasing size of animal farms and high regional con-
centration of farms create pressure on water quality but
may also provide possibilities for new innovative solutions
(Schnitkey and Miranda 1993; Harrison et al. 1996; Aillery
et al. 2005). A livestock farm has barns and manure stor-
ages with possible leakages, and they are considered point
sources from a policy angle. Cultivation of fodder, crop,
and pasture are in turn sources of diffuse loads but manure
complicates cultivation and land use in livestock farms.
Manure is kept in storages that may leak, sometimes
with detrimental impacts. When manure is used as a fer-
tilizer and spread on the soil surface, nutrients may easily
be released to water ways. Water protection can be pro-
moted by renovating all manure storages, facilitating better
timing and utilization of the manure applications, and
shifting to more efficient spreading technologies. Jansson
et al. (in the present volume) find large differences in the
load reductions from manure investments between the
countries. While the potential is modest in Denmark, which
already has mandatory and high requirements regarding
utilization of nitrogen in manure, the effects are higher in
Sweden, Finland, Poland, and the three Baltic states. Suf-
ficient storage capacity is important for farmers to be able
to apply the manure on fields during the period when the
crops grow and utilize the nutrients from the manure in
spring and early summer (Tybirk et al. 2013). The capacity
requirements differ between 5 and 10 months in countries
around the Baltic Sea. Data are scarce documenting current
capacities, but there are options for improvements to
facilitate better utilization. The type of slurry also affects
the ability to utilize the nutrients. While the share of slurry
is 80% in Denmark, this share is 5–10% in Poland. Overall,
nearly 50% of the manure in the Baltic Sea region is solid
(Tybirk et al. 2013).
Thus, we conclude that there is potential for increasing
investment in manure storage to reduce manure leakage
cost-effectively.
Structural change in livestock production
The development of livestock units and livestock farms has
followed a similar pattern in all Baltic Sea countries. From
2005 to 2013, the number of bovine animals has remained
approximately the same in all countries, with a slight
decrease in total numbers (from 17 869 million livestock
units (LSU) to 17 273 million LSU). The number of pigs
has decreased in all countries, with a total decline of 14%.
Poultry production has increased in almost all countries,
with a total increase of approximately 21%. The strongest
trend, however, lies in the number of livestock farms: it has
decreased by almost 40%, indicating also an increasing
farm size and manure concentration (Eurostat 2018). The
same structural development will continue, generating
increasing pressure for local manure management.
The structural change in livestock farms has important
implications for the availability of land for manure appli-
cations. Larger farms sizes entail higher risks that manure
will be overapplied on the fields closest to animal facilities.
Solutions to tackle the problem vary across countries. In
many countries, the Nitrate Directive or phosphorus fer-
tilizer limits command that expanding livestock farms have
enough manure spreading area. Clearing peat land forest to
create fields in Finland has been very detrimental, because
new fields have increased deforestation, GHG emissions,
and nutrient runoff. Denmark has promoted biogas pro-
duction, which provides climate benefits but does not
alleviate the transportation cost problem unless nutrient
separation techniques are adopted.
Thus, current policies have not adapted to the rapid
increase in the size of livestock farms (Kauppila et al.
2017), and only few innovations have taken place to solve
the manure problem. One reason for this is that livestock
farms in most places have not been subjected to tight
regulation on manure issues (Jansson et al. in the present
volume). Large livestock farms are, however, industrial
plants and should be treated as such. Environmental per-
mits provide a tool to promote progress in solving the
manure problem. Experience from the US poultry industry
provides a good example for how things may evolve. For
broiler operations in the Delmarva Peninsula, the US pro-
duces more than 600 million birds in a year (Kleinman
et al. 2011). Regulation of poultry litter from large farms
became more stringent as the states (Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia) responded to water quality issues of the
Chesapeake Bay. Delaware, for instance, implemented
fully the Delaware Nutrient Management Act in 2007. The
recent emergence of brokers and industrial size poultry
litter processors represents an innovative response of the
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industry to tightened regulation1. Referring to this experi-
ence, we argue the following:
Tighter regulation of livestock production and the pro-
cessing of manure are important for obtaining new tech-
nological solutions and business opportunities.
The special challenge of phosphorus
Manure contains nutrients in an uneven agronomic ratio:
too much phosphorus relative to nitrogen. Farmers usually
target nitrogen fertilization and ignore the applied excess
phosphorus, as it does not reduce yields. This creates
spatial and temporal challenges for phosphorus policies.
Due to increasing transport costs, farmers spread manure
closer to the farm center and use mineral fertilizers in more
distant fields (Schnitkey and Mirada 1993). Lo¨tjo¨nen et al.
(unpubl., results) demonstrate that the same pattern also
occurs in the socially optimal solution, but manure is
spread less at each distance and for a longer distance than
in the private solution. Therefore, the phosphorus content
of soil is higher closer to the farm center. Phosphorus from
manure accumulates in soil over time, reflecting the annual
phosphorus fertilization by manure, the uptake of phos-
phorus by crops, and soil chemical processes (Iho 2010).
Large phosphorus reserves in the soil increase dissolved
reactive phosphorus load, which is directly available for
algae growth, creating the need of controlling soil P. Soil
phosphorus content decreases with distance, but assuming
a constant use of mineral phosphorus, it becomes constant.
This implies that nutrient runoff differs between parcels in
livestock farms.
Unlike in crop production farms, differentiated P policy
is optimal, albeit difficult to establish for livestock farms.
Furthermore, reducing phosphorus loads will take time,
because runoff of dissolved reactive phosphorus depends
on soil P, which changes very slowly over time. A target
value could be set on the steady-state soil P to define the
upper limit on phosphorus fertilization and thereby on
manure spreading per hectare (Iho 2010). As the reduction
is possible only in the long run, short-term measures, such
as gypsum or structural liming, are needed to reduce
phosphorus leakage in the short run (Kosenius and Olli-
kainen 2019). Finally, a tax on mineral fertilizers has an
impact on manure spreading, making it more profitable to
use manure on more distant fields. Farmers reduce manure
use on all locations to make it last for the new locations
(Lo¨tjo¨nen et al. unpubl., results).
Increasing farm sizes and regional concentration may
provide a starting point for new solutions to the
environmental problems related to manure. With strong
spatial concentration, it may become profitable to process
the manure in industrial-scale facilities, providing a way
out of the problems of large-scale animal production. It
would also help prevent spatial accumulation of manure
nutrients by processing them into forms less expensive to
transport and overapplication of the relatively more abun-
dant manure nutrient by decoupling nitrogen and phos-
phorus fractions. Moreover, it would offer livestock
farmers the possibility to focus on the core of their busi-
nesses instead of struggling to meet the manure regulations.
After all, regulatory issues of manure management are
found to be important factors when animal farms are
making their relocation decisions (Stirm and St-Pierre
2003). Essentially, this would be a Turn Key solution for
farm manure management under wise regulation.
Our suggestion is that promoting industrial-scale treat-
ment of manure in the food processing sector would pro-
vide a solution to the multiple environmental challenges
created by current manure management in livestock farms.
COHERENCE OF WATER AND CLIMATE-
RELATED POLICIES
There are no effective climate policies toward agriculture
at the moment, but by 2020, the land use sector will
become a part of EU’s climate policy, and rightly, agri-
culture must take its share in climate mitigation and
adaptation efforts. In the climate context, agriculture pre-
sents both a problem and a solution. GHG emissions from
cultivation, soil and animals are considerable and boost
global warming, while nutrient runoff has regional impacts
on water quality. Agriculture is a solution when reducing
emissions and especially sequestering carbon in soils. Not
all measures, however, promote both water quality and
climate targets. It is important to ensure coherence between
climate and water policies targeting agriculture.
Crop rotation with legumes is beneficial for both climate
and water ecosystems (Lo¨tjo¨nen and Ollikainen 2017).
Legumes help to reduce the use of mineral fertilizers by
fixing nitrogen from the air and providing the residual
fertilization effect for crops to be grown the following year.
Legumes, buffer strips, and crop rotation promote simul-
taneously both climate and water goals. A constraining
factor is limited demand for legumes, implying that it is
well-suited to livestock production areas only. Here, the
increasing ambition of the EU’s legume policies would
promote both water and climate targets.
Introducing climate policies to livestock production
provides a challenge, as they have only few possibilities to
reduce GHG emissions. For instance, both manure man-
agement and diet make only minor contributions. The main
1 https://www.perduefarms.com/news/press-releases/perdue-expands-
nutrient-recycling/ and https://www.voanews.com/a/mayland-chicken-
manure-global-environmental-polution/3050598.html.
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source of GHG emissions is methane emissions from ani-
mals, and currently the only known means to reduce
emission from animals is to reduce their number. Water
policies in contrast target a larger set of choices and pro-
vide livestock farms a leeway to adjust cultivation and
manure handling without reducing the number of animals.
Thus, climate policy hits more strongly on the profits of
livestock farms (Lo¨tjo¨nen et al. unpubl., results). The water
quality targets must not be compromised when climate
policy is given more attention (Nainggolan et al. 2018).
Thus, we emphasize the following:
Introducing the much required climate policies to agri-
culture must be made with full coherence to water quality
targets requiring novel performance-based type instruments
for agriculture.
INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION
Agriculture in the Baltic Sea region needs higher produc-
tivity, active climate mitigation, and better performance in
promoting water quality. Growing population in the
catchment implies an increased pressure on surface water
quality. Society must promote long-term solutions for all
these issues through improved technologies, production
systems and social discoveries. The role of environmental
policy for innovation and technological development is
therefore important. Three questions regarding innovations
are of particular interest: (i) Do current policies provide
sufficient incentives for innovation? (ii) If not, how can the
incentives be improved? (iii) Will the novel technologies
be adopted by the intended users?
Markets suffer from under-provisioning of innovations:
innovators’ net gains from innovation are small in com-
parison to the overall gains, because innovations could be
copied by other firms (Goulder and Parry 2008). Stringent
environmental policies encourage innovation if they imply
that polluting becomes more expensive, allow the polluter
freely to choose among alternative abatement technologies,
and credit the effects of the novel technologies against the
firm’s abatement obligations. The choice of policy instru-
ment is crucial for providing incentives for innovation:
market-based instruments, such as taxes and tradeable
permits, tend to perform better than command-and-control
(Requate 2005). If command-and-control is applied, per-
formance-based policies provide stronger incentives for
innovation than design standards, i.e., regulation of tech-
nology use (Shortle and Horan 2017). Currently, taxes and
tradable permits are absent from water quality policies in
the Baltic Sea region. Instead, performance standards are
widely used for wastewater treatment plants, while design
standards and technology-specific subsidies are common in
the agricultural sector. Incentives for innovation in
abatement technology are weak, especially in the agricul-
tural sector, where the environmental effect of novel
technologies that are not subsidized does not increase farm
profits.
A comparison of environmental policies toward
WWTPs and agriculture provides a good example. Ana-
lyzing Swedish environmental policies over 50 years for
improved water quality in sewage plants, Ha¨ggmark
Svensson and Elofsson (2018) show that these policies
have increased the number of patents for technologies that
reduce nutrient emissions by 40–70% in the years imme-
diately following the introduction of new policy. In a
corresponding analysis of agriculture, they find no effect of
environmental policy on innovation of nutrient saving
technologies, suggesting that policies have been unsuc-
cessful in this regard.
A next challenge is to make farms adopt novel tech-
nologies that reduce nutrient emissions to the environment.
A study by Konrad et al. (2019), covering Poland, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark and Estonia for three nutrient tech-
nologies (manure spreading, manure storage, precision
fertilizing), confirms the observation from earlier studies
that large farms have a higher propensity to adopt new and
costly technologies (Lynne 1995; Fuglie and Kascak 2001).
This suggests that the ongoing structural development in
agriculture may be environmentally beneficial through its
effect on technology adoption.
To strengthen innovation as a tool for meeting the Baltic
Sea nutrient reduction targets at low cost, an increased use
of market- and performance-based policies is needed. A
first step could be to apply performance-based policies for
larger farms, hence treating them as point sources rather
than nonpoint sources, as their having a higher propensity
to adopt novel technologies suggests this would enhance
both innovation and adoption of novel technologies. The
second step would be to develop schemes for nutrient
trading, either among point sources (Hautakangas and
Ollikainen 2019) or between point and nonpoint sources
(Shortle and Horan 2017). The scale of trading would be of
central importance for the size of incentives for innovation,
as it determines the demand for novel technologies from
the users.
Innovation policy must be directly linked to water
policies in agriculture in the Baltic Sea region by tighter
regulation and use of market-based instruments.
VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS AND FLEXIBLE
MECHANISMS
The analysis has thus far focused on policies or policy
instruments that create favorable circumstances for point
sources or farmers. The implicit assumption underpinning
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our discussion has been that once the incentives are set
right, the actors will fill their roles for the required effects
in the Baltic Sea environment. Voluntary actions by actors
may nicely complement the mandatory policies toward
point and nonpoint sources.
An interesting form of water policies is to extend ideas
of carbon neutrality to water protection issues: companies,
cities or private actors could strive for nutrient neutrality by
offsetting their loads that remain after abatement. For
instance, phosphorus neutrality is a worthwhile goal, as it
promotes the quality of coastal waters. A municipal waste
water treatment plant (WWTP) and city or an industrial
point source could offset their loads by buying reduction
from another agent that can reduce loads at lower social
costs. Moreover, municipal WWTPs could be willing to
promote water protection if an equivalent sum of their
investment could play for higher reductions elsewhere in
the drainage basin. Therefore, pursuing nutrient neutrality
should be promoted by creating transparent and clear sys-
tems for nutrient compensations. To provide an example,
four Finnish WWTPs located on the coast of the Gulf of
Finland compensated for their P loads by investing in
abatement in Vitebsk, Belorussia.
More importantly, nutrient compensations may have a
much higher status in the future. Water protection within
the EU is unified by the Water Framework Directive
(WFD). The recent Weser ruling of the European Court of
Justice (C-461/13) strengthened the legal status of WFD-
specific water quality standards, which will be reflected in
environmental permitting processes also around the Baltic
Sea. Under a strict interpretation, an environmental permit
cannot be given to an economic activity if it increases the
pollution of elements critical to water quality standards.
To prevent the emergence of unintended constraints
from well-intended regulatory changes, some flexibility
should be built into environmental instruments. One option
is utilizing nutrient offsets in the permitting process. In our
example, the facility would create nutrient credits by
decreasing the nutrient loading risk from the livestock
facilities it collects the manure from. These credits would
be taken into account when determining the net effect of
the new facility on nutrient pollution. Similar practices
could be used for many economic activities as long as the
basic condition is met: the new or expanding economic
activity together with the offsetting credit generates a net
decrease to total nutrient loading to the respective water
body.
We must ensure that the regulation is keeping pace with
not only the structural change and the challenges it imposes
but also new innovations that help mitigate nutrient
loading.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Our analysis has identified weaknesses and possibilities for
improvements in Baltic Sea protection policies. For point
sources, the key weaknesses include too lax regulatory
policies toward WWTPs and missing incentives for
developing new and novel abatement solutions, for
instance, promoting a circular economy. For nonpoint
sources, current CAP policies prevent using performance-
based policies. Inefficient regulation of livestock farming
and missing incentives for promoting technological
developments belong to other key weaknesses. The
invented novel policy principles and instruments facilitate
improving the environmental and economic efficiency of
Baltic Sea policies. They provide polluting agents with
stronger incentives to protect the sea, to promote envi-
ronmentally friendly innovations, and to engage voluntary
citizens in useful work for the Baltic Sea, and they con-
stitute a sound standpoint to meet the challenges that cli-
mate change brings to the Baltic Sea region in coherence
with water policy requirements.
The research community can now provide key solutions
to reduce loading and fit the long-term economic growth to
the ecological limits of the sea with all stakeholders
engaged to determined actions. A Baltic Sea Socioeco-
nomic Action Plan is called for to systematically update
and strengthen nutrient policies in the Baltic Sea region
countries. As the first steps toward developing this plan, we
suggest that the following features should be the backbone
of such a plan.
1. Cost-effective abatement with equalization of marginal
abatement cost should be the guiding principle of
nutrient policies toward point and nonpoint sources,
because this principle reflects best the technological
and economic possibilities to reduce loads the most.
2. Both the EU’s Urban Waste Water Directive and
HELCOM recommendations are inattentive relative to
current abatement possibilities and costs in WWTPs.
They should therefore be scaled up accordingly to
promote cost-effective abatement.
3. The rigid EU CAP policy toward agriculture should be
changed to facilitate modern, incentive-based, and
performance-oriented agri-environmental policy
instruments instead of the current measure-based
approach.
4. Tighter regulation of large livestock farms and
promoting industrial-scale treatment of manure in the
food processing sector provide possibilities for new
technological solutions and business opportunities.
5. Promoting industrial-scale treatment of manure by
vertically integrating the food processing sector would
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provide one possible solution to farm manure
management.
6. There are ample possibilities to create coherent
nutrient and climate mitigation measures in agriculture
that should be utilized.
7. Regulation must keep pace with economic develop-
ment and tightening environmental standards by
utilizing flexible and innovative instruments, such as
nutrient offsets.
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